Meanwhile, liberal democracy itself appears to be in retreat, as varieties of ‘new authoritarianism’ rise to new salience in countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Philippines and Turkey. The uncertainties of Europe, as the quiet bulwark of the wider liberal international order, have global significance. Simultaneously, Britain's decision to leave the EU, and a myriad other troubles besetting Europe, appear to mark an end to the long postwar project of building a greater union. Trade, alliances, international law, multilateralism, environment, torture and human rights-on all these issues, President Trump has made statements that, if acted upon, would effectively bring to an end America's role as leader of the liberal world order. For the first time since the 1930s, the United States has elected a president who is actively hostile to liberal internationalism. Today, this liberal international order is in crisis. Looking at the world at the end of the twentieth century, one could be excused for thinking that history was moving in a progressive and liberal internationalist direction.
NATO expanded, the WTO was launched and the G20 took centre stage. As the postwar order expanded, so too did its governance institutions. Countries in east Asia, eastern Europe and Latin America made democratic transitions and became integrated into the world economy. After the end of the Cold War, this order spread outwards. Western Europe and Japan emerged as key partners, tying their security and economic fortunes to this extended liberal order. Along the way, the United States became the ‘first citizen’ of this order, providing hegemonic leadership-anchoring the alliances, stabilizing the world economy, fostering cooperation and championing ‘free world’ values. After the Second World War, the United States and its partners built a multifaceted and sprawling international order, organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity. Liberal internationalism has lost its connection to the pursuit of social and economic advancement within western countries.įor seven decades the world has been dominated by a western liberal order. Within the West, liberal internationalism is increasingly seen, not as a source of stability and solidarity among like-minded states, but as a global playing field for the wealthy and influential. In recent decades, the working and middle classes in advanced industrial democracies-the original constituencies and beneficiaries of an open and cooperative international order-have faced rising economic inequality and stagnation.
Liberal democracy itself appears fragile and polarized, vulnerable to far right populism and backlash politics. The centrist and progressive coalitions that lay behind the postwar liberal order have weakened. But, in fact, liberal internationalism is more deeply threatened by developments within the West itself. In the face of hostile, revisionist states, the United States and Europe were expected to stand shoulder to shoulder to protect the gains from 70 years of cooperation. The threats to liberal internationalism were expected to come from rising non-western states seeking to undermine or overturn the postwar order. However, in what follows, I argue that despite its troubles, liberal internationalism still has a future. No one can be sure how deep the crisis of liberal internationalism runs.
These are not happy times for liberal internationalists.
0 kommentar(er)
